

JOSEPH KOSUTH


Freud, Wittgenstein and Musil

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
Freud, Wittgenstein and Musil


September 12 – October 27, 2012

LEO CASTELLI









~~Einladung X. dringend.~~ [~~Provisions re "Verräte erhalten~~
~~urgent.~~] The solution of the riddle starts received, invitation
~~mentioned in it. X. was the author of a book from the name~~
~~write an "Einleitung [introduction]."~~ This to which I was
~~had been turned into the "Einladung "Einleitung"~~
~~then able to recall that some days earlier~~²³ [~~invitation~~].
~~was a "Verräte [preface]" to another book; I had sent my~~
~~acknowledgement of its arrival. The true text so this was the~~
~~run: "Verräte erhalten, Einleitung X. had very probably~~
~~received, introduction X. urgent."~~ ~~dringend.~~ [~~I~~
~~end.~~ [~~Provisions re "Verräte erhalten, Einladung~~¹⁸ X.
~~on of the riddle starts received, invitation X. urgent.~~] Th
~~s the author of a book from the name X. mentioned in it~~
~~[introduction]."~~ This to which I was to write an "Ein
~~l into the "Einladung "Einleitung" was what had been~~
~~at some days earlier~~¹⁷¹⁸ [~~invitation~~]. I was then able to
~~ee]" to another book; I had sent my publishers a "Verräte~~
~~arrival. The true text so this was the acknowledgement~~
~~alten, Einleitung X. had very probably run: "Verräte~~
~~on X. urgent."~~ ~~dringend.~~ [~~Preface received, in~~

ten, Einladung Y. dringend.] [Provisions re 'Vorräte
tion Y. urgent.'] The solution of the riddle starts ceived,
e Y. mentioned in it. Y. was the author of a book from the
as to write an 'Einleitung [introduction]'. This to which
was what had been turned into the 'Einladung 'Einleit
I was then able to recall that some days earlier ³⁴ [invitat
publishers a 'Vorrede [preface]' to another book; I had se
e acknowledgement of its arrival. The true text so this
ably run: 'Vorrede erhalten, Einleitung Y. had ve
Preface received, introduction Y. urgent.'] dringe
dringend.] [Provisions re 'Vorräte erhalten, Einlad
e solution of the riddle starts ceived, invitation Y. urge
Y. was the author of a book from the name Y. mentio
leitung [introduction]'. This to which I was to write
turned into the 'Einladung 'Einleitung' was what he
recall that some days earlier ¹⁸¹⁹ [invitation]'. I was then
le [preface]' to another book; I had sent my publishers
t of its arrival. The true text so this was the acknowle
ede erhalten, Einleitung Y. had very probably run
troduction Y. urgent.'] dringend.] [Preface rec

276. But don't we at least, *mean*
look at a colour and name our colour
detached the colour-*impression* from
(This ought to arouse our suspicion

something quite definite when we
our-impresion? It is as if we
m the object, like a membrane.
ns.)





Ist das nicht wie eine Brücke, von der

mit Anfangs-

und Hauptkern verhalten sich mit dem Wasser zusammenhängend







'Zero & Not', 1987, Neon, 24 x 128 x 2 3/4 inches

A PRELIMINARY MAP FOR *ZERO & NOT* 1986

We have a cluster of contingencies: a text, which represents an order of arbitrary forms which make a systemic sense (believable while they teach belief). The words are meaningful, contingently, in relation to the sentence, and the sentence to the paragraph. The paragraph, from *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* by Sigmund Freud, is meaningful in relation to the exegesis of Freud's work. The use of Freud's work, in this context, is contingent on understanding its use by the 'author' of *Zero & Not* (beginning with *Cathexis* in 1981) as a kind of conceptual 'architecture'—a ready-made order that, while anchored to the world, provides, as a theoretical object, a dynamic system. This text, though, is also just a device: a surface, a skin. There is another syntax, also anchored to the world, which is the architecture of rooms which also orders this work. While the order remains there, the gaps and omissions (the entrances, exits, views in and out—that which puts the work in the world) rather than disrupt the order clarifies and qualifies the room (the world) and art (that which is Not, but within this order, is). The cluster of 'arbitrary' orders has also a 'made' order which unifies it, beyond the unification given to it by the architecture of the room(s) itself. It begins with a counting-off of the paragraphs, repeated until the walls are full; and that cancellation which constructs as it erases, suggesting 'one thing' (a field of language itself) present, while removed. Not just absence presented, it is language reduced to words, making the texture of reading itself an arrival at language, an arrival which constructs other orders, ones that blind as they make themselves visible. The numbers separate the paragraphs as they unify the work. This provides the field in which the color-coding systemically underscores, repeatedly, the fragments that make up the unitary paragraph, a made-up order which constructs (or deconstructs) the paragraph differently than the other order (of the world) which makes the paragraph with sentences. And differently, too, than that order which made rooms out of windows, doors, changing ceilings, and those walls which presume the lives which will be lived within them.

THE PLAY OF THE UNSAYABLE: A Preface and Ten Remarks on Art and Wittgenstein 1989

Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Preface

Ludwig Wittgenstein's task in the *Tractatus*, as I see it, was a clarification of language. First, he wanted to give language a scientific, clear, specific, and sure basis: to articulate what *could* be spoken. His second agenda, to show what *could not* be spoken, was, by necessity, to be left unsaid through omission. But this agenda is, I think, incomplete, because his insight was, in part, also an acknowledgment of the collapse of the authentic voice of the traditional philosophical enterprise to speak of such things. If one takes as *language* the systemic organization of our cultural codes—our inherited *cultural horizon*, within which meaning is made (and consciousness formed)—then one can see that it is precisely here, manifested as art, where the constructive elements for indirect assertions are to be found.

The task of Ludwig Wittgenstein's early work was the construction of a general critique of language in which it can be seen that logic and science had a proper role within ordinary descriptive language. The result of this is a representation of the world parallel to mathematical models of physical phenomena. This leads to his second (and perhaps more important) point, that by falling *outside* the limits of this descriptive language, the questions of value, ethics and *meaning of life* must be the objects of another kind of insight and treatment. It is this second aspect of language where Wittgenstein's insights prove most useful in relation to art.

The activity I would like for us to review is our collective concept of what we call art now, and from that to consider what future role we can propose for it. It can be seen, I believe, that the assorted elements of the

activity we call art now comprises a practice much more specific than we would suspect. This *cluster* of play collectively constitutes an implicit understanding of itself as a kind of *post-philosophical* activity. The work I am referring to here cannot be simply explained as the latest continuance of an *avant-garde* tradition. While that tradition may continue, in varying degrees, as art's inherited political culture, it in no way explains the increasing interest and presence of contemporary art in our society. In contrast to the immediate gratification of the entertainment commodities of mass culture, such work appears specialized and obscure, if not esoteric and elitist. Yet socially and economically, such artifacts have not only had continued cultural presence in this century, but the audience and participants for such work continue to grow, not decline.

The world that has arrived at the late 20th century has great difficulty in distinguishing the meaning of our accumulation of cultural forms outside the networks of power relations, economic or otherwise. In some sense this can be seen as a *meaning crisis*. In the era of the crumbling of ideologies, when the religion of science offers its spiritual poverty, society feels the risk of living adrift of meaning. Art, that text looking for a context, risks suffering for the flexibility of its manifestations as it continues to re-locate itself within those structures which make meaning. In our present so-called *Post-modern* time the traditional historicist rationales of art have increasingly become a process of market validation rather than historical understanding. Such models of art, when internalized by young artists or art historians, increasingly provide a context in which the market makes the meaning and gives the value. If art is more than the fashions of expensive decoration and it is to be more than the mindless regurgitation of traditional forms ignorant of tradition, then you will understand the importance of a reconsideration of no less than our fundamental understanding of the role of art. This exhibition on the 100th anniversary of the birth of Ludwig Wittgenstein, presents itself as an appropriate occasion to re-think not just *how* art functions, but *why*.

1. The desire to understand cultural formation, and particularly art, in relation to language is the initial foundation to actualize a Wittgensteinian insight: drawing out the relation of art to language began the production of a language whose very function it was to *show*, rather than *say*. Such artworks function in a way which circumvents significantly much of what limits language. Art, it can be argued, *describes* reality. But, unlike language, artworks—it can also be argued—simultaneously describe *how* they describe it. Granted, art can be seen here as self-referential, but importantly, not *meaninglessly* self-referential. What art shows in such a manifestation is, indeed, *how* it functions. This is best revealed in works which feign to *say*, but do so as an art proposition and reveal the difference (while showing its similarity) with language. This was, of course, the role of language in my work beginning in 1965. It seemed to me that if language *itself* could be used to function as an artwork, then that difference would bare the device of art's language-game. An artwork then, as such a *double mask*, provided the possibility of not just a reflection on itself, but an indirect double reflection on the nature of language, through art, to culture itself. '*Do not forget*,' writes Wittgenstein, '*that a poem, even though it is composed in the language of information, is not used in the language-game of giving information.*'

2. Wittgenstein's '*unsayable*' constituted the significant value, because for him it underscored exactly those elements that cannot be verified by language. We can note, however, a process of cultural verification which occurs in art when the *language-game(s)* of art accommodate an additional shift, and adjust to a new *rule*. The change (rupture, inclusion) becomes institutionalized and is incorporated into the *reality* of the game, thereby forming part of the horizon of culture which produces consciousness. Wittgenstein found the necessity creatively to keep a separation between *fact* and *value*. This functions well as a model for us. The facts of an artwork do not, as cultural value, necessarily provide their own direct meaning. This is one of the major objections to both the *naturalized aesthetic*/decorative and expressionist theories of art, as well as one of the chief dangers of the presence of the market, in the meaning-making mechanism of art. It was Wittgenstein's project to preserve silently what was of value.

3. (Expressionism). The *self* is grammatical—it punctuates. Thus it cannot be named because every attempt to do that would presume it. It can be shown, and, as art, it can represent the limits of the world (culture, history) as a manifestation of it. As we *name art* we name the world, and make visible the self. The *language of information*—even in its most philosophical form—is incapable of such *descriptions*: the self and the world, within the realm of such language, share no empirical moment.

4. Except what was the aesthetic *object*, we have with contemporary art now the possibility of that *object* being not limited to sensual escape but to a systemic conceptual leap—to a *discourse* which, by necessity, includes a reconceptualization of the world, insofar as the meaning-object which engendered this leap could not be *seen* without an experience of it as representing an idea in the world.

5. We are confronted with a riddle when we confront the basic questions of life, and speculative language is not capable of solving it, for it is not to *be solved*. What we *are* capable of doing is showing the nature of the riddle as its cultural formation is historically grasped, through the codes of the living in their own time.

6. ‘*In mathematics and logic, process and result are equivalent.*’

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Works of art, as *punctuation*, are not a material of *content*, but rather marks of positioning within the interaction of a context.

7. It probably began here: an understanding that art had to make visible its own internal definition as it was perceived by the culture which had inherited it. The modernist project began a process in which the self-conceptualization of a practice shifted to see not just its own limits, but institutionalize those limits as a form of self-knowledge. It is here that the practice of art took on a philosophical aspect; the history of art in the 20th century, by and large, is a record of this process.

8. One question remains unsaid: What is *this* text? This text owes its existence to the parentheses of my practice as an artist. This text speaks from that first and last. While philosophy would want to speak of the world, it would need to speak of art as part of that, if only to deny it. That which permits art to be seen as *part of the world* also nominates it as an event in social and cultural space. No matter what actual form the activity of art takes, its history gives it a concrete presence. Framed by such a presence then, this theory is engaged as part of a practice. Such theory I'll call primary. Secondary theory may be no less useful (in many cases *more* useful) but the point I'm stressing is that it has a different ontology. Primary theory is no more interesting than the practice, *in toto*, is. However, theory not linked to an art practice is an unconcretized (or *unfertilized*) conversation after (or before) the fact. It is the *fact* of an artistic process which, having a location as an event, permits the social and cultural weight of a presence independent of pragmatic language. It is, in fact, the nominated presence of the process which *allows* secondary theory its *external object* to be discussed. Secondary theory, like philosophy in general, ultimately locates itself as an activity which attempts to explain the world that the external *presence* represents. It may be theory discussing theory, but the discussion of secondary theory always presumes the location of its subject, at some level, as having linkage to the *world*. Behind every text about art rests the *possibility* of an artwork, if not the presence of one.

Texts *about* artworks are experienced differently than texts that *are* artworks. It is abundantly clear by now, that we do not need to have an object to have an artwork, but we must have a difference manifested in order to have it seen. That *difference* which separates an artwork from a conversation also separates, fundamentally, primary theory from secondary theory.

The work of art is essentially a *play* within the meaning system of art; it is *formed* as that *play* and cannot be separated from it—this also means, however, that a change in its formation/representation is meaningful only insofar as it effects its *play*. My point above is that primary theory is *part* of that play, the two are inseparably linked. This is not a claim that the

commentary of secondary theory can make. *Talking about art* is a parallel activity to making art, but without *feet*—it is providing meaning without an *event context* that socially commits subjective responsibility for consciousness produced (making a world). Standing guard, just out of sight, is the detached priority of an implied *objective* science.

One can perhaps, as well, understand the texture of the difference I am referring to between primary and secondary texts in the way primary texts are treated *by* secondary texts. I am considering here the treatment of artists' writings by art critics and historians. Beneath the often condescending *special* status such texts are given (used, like artworks are, as *nature* for the historians and critics to make *culture* from) there lurks a kind of philosophical unease, as though this sleeping Dracula may awaken, daylight or not, a professional stake, through his heart or not; and ravage *their* countryside. (Well, here we are).

9. One of the lessons for art that we can derive from the *Philosophical Investigations* is that I believe the later Wittgenstein attempted with his parables and language-games to construct theoretical *object-texts* which could make recognizable (*show*) aspects of language that, philosophically, he could not assert explicitly. This aspect of philosophy, *as a process to be shown*, resists the reification of the direct philosophical assertion.

The works in this exhibition—potentially viewed as specialized or obscure—should not be seen as self-contained *pictures of the world* in the way of much traditional art. The *direct* assertion of either a depiction of the world (a view) or *in* the world (an expression) *in terms of art* can reflect only the social location of a conservative institutionalized perspective. Such work reflects *the presumed view* of a unified society, as well as an earlier philosophical bias and world-view that is no longer credible. By such standards the work shown here will certainly fail, and thus seem *esoteric*. These works, not unlike Wittgenstein's later philosophy, suggest such *pictorial statements* (be it exterior/view or interior/expression) are a limited understanding of art's *language* and role. The work included in this exhibition becomes meaningful, like language, on the surface of its

play; everything in art is *simply put* before us, as it is often said. The *direct assertions* referred to above presume an ability to reveal *deep meaning* about the world, *directly*. What art *reveals* as a deeper meaning is shown, indirectly, as our cultural mechanisms are revealed (what I once called our ‘ethnologic’). The potential of art lies in this *putting before us* a *manifestation* concretized as a cultural formation, and not as a (primary) theoretic assertion. This role for art would then suggest a practice which looks at *what* is used, and *how* it is used *outside* (as well as inside) of art’s use of *meaning*; this will provide the culturally formed location of the *why* it is used. Indeed, it is this passage from *outside* to *inside*, (and what it tells us about the nature of the process of the practice) which, for the moment, is central to any understanding of art’s post-philosophical role.

10. Part of the process which has limited our conception of art are the institutionalized paths *meaning* itself is permitted to take. As long as art is conceived of as only a *vehicle* for meaning, and the meaning of meaning remains closed, art’s self-depiction will remain the very embodiment of society’s resistance to transformation. Art offers no such *deep meaning* in those terms. The meaning of art is how we *describe* it. The *description of art*—which art itself manifests—consists of a dynamic cluster of *uses*, shifting from work to work, of elements taken from the very fabric of culture—no different from those which construct reality day to day.

Until artists abandon their presumed, uncritical and unexamined *meaning* for art, and instead consider closely their *uses* of elements within their work, and the function of that work within its larger cultural societal framework, art will continue along its path of atrophy into the decorative and fashionable. Until we extricate art from being the pragmatic agent of *expression* or depicted meaning, it will not gain that critical sense, which, if only implicitly, sees the terms of such meaning as petrified, and as such, functions as a signal-switch of power relations, like philosophy: a conduit closed and circular, severed from any social purpose. The illusion of the window of belief in both painting and philosophy remains, today, as a *deus ex machina* holding the viewer’s position in check.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON THIS 'SUBJECT' 1992

The language of feelings is conservative, even when the feeling is not.

Robert Musil

Les *Nourritures Terrestres* is fine...it's very fine...But dear,
promise me from now on never to write / any more.

In art, don't you see, there is no first person.

Oscar Wilde to the young André Gide

I.

Some indications, more as a kind of orientation rather than a theory, can be provided by me in approaching this work. Such work asks questions, some of which are apparently closer than others. Initially one could ask: what is assumed about the viewer/reader of such work? Such a discussion must necessarily begin at the experience which precedes the point-of-reception. Clearly, recent art suffers from a kind of habituated experience, one which can best be called 'consumptive passive.' That is, art, as part of culture, has been reduced to entertainment, one entity among many on the market. As availability of any of these goods becomes naturalized, the role of both the 'speaker' and 'listener' within culture in enacting a responsible relationship with the meaning of what is produced is increasingly lessened. What this naturalization process does is also to diminish the subjective power (with its ethical—even moral—weight) of actual individuals accountable for their beliefs.

The habituated, passive consumers of art are part of an agenda not suited for asking difficult questions. This concept of entertainment is based on an escape, which functions finally as a form of distancing. An aura of reception. Alternatively, one's relationship with art can be *engaged*; here the viewer/reader enters into the process and participates in the production of meaning. The art functions as the interface between two sides of a subjective, yet responsible, role. Such cultural empowerment is a necessary check on the present drift toward the limiting of political will to the consumers' 'vote' in the act of shopping. Artists, working from

Joseph Kosuth, first published in *No thing, no self, no form, no principle (was certain)* [exh. cat.], Villa Merkel, Esslingen, 1992

that horizon of memory—both recorded and personal—within which all of our consciousness is formed, have the ability to show us the world as we produce it. (In this sense, art is an essential political institution, but without the structural narcissism which plagues the politics which goes under its own name.)

The disengaged viewer/reader, avoiding responsibility for the meaning which is produced at the point of personal reception, is identical with the artist who produces work to function solely within such a market of meaning. This cultural betrayal of an inherited responsibility as an artist is not simply limited to the purveyors of mindless decoration, although they abound. Our perspective on our activity has been necessarily obscured by the debate over the relative merits of that form of sentimental technology called painting. The issue over expressionism (essentially the basis of most painting now, at least philosophically) is not one of taste, it is a struggle over our vision of the future role of art. To the extent that I was one of those who initiated this debate over twenty-five years ago, I can say that I am fairly amazed to see how resistant a practice has been to insights initiated from within. Resistance is not immunity, however, and one can see in most exhibitions of contemporary art (DOCUMENTA IX or *Platzverführung*, for example) the effects of this struggle. Of course, the easiest misunderstanding has been one in which the issues of our institutionalized, traditional view of art are simply given a gloss of relevance; a notion that new taste is a rejection (thereby somehow a critique) of the old taste. Taste has only a negative role to play in art, and on its own is seldom substantive. (Taste, of course, vacillates radically and I've been bemused to observe over the years the cycle of terms employed by those who have judged my activities by a view of art based on taste: too dry, too banal, colorless, too elegant, no design, too well-designed, and, naturally; *expressionless*.)

The speaking subject has, finally, no simply defined limits in its dialectical role in art. It is the roles, indeed, that have been traditionally defined but are no longer operable which have led to one of the more important issues to emerge in the form of a crisis. This revolves around the responsibility of the art historian and critic, and *their* subjective role in the meaning-making process in contemporary art. The career needs and social relationships which

so greatly affect their decision-making, one would think, would eliminate the veneer of 'objectivity' which this activity borrows from science. Artists are neither more nor less subjective than art historians, we simply take subjective responsibility for the meaning of our production. This profession should do the same. The ability of artists to defend themselves has limitations built into it by the art historical enterprise itself, as the reverse face of a process which masks its own subjectivity. We need to be on the alert for art historians who seem to think that an objective history speaks *through* them, and that they can wield that power as subjectively as they wish, and as silently.

I bring this discussion up here because one cannot consider the reception of art works from the relation of viewer/reader to artist, and its reverse, without also considering how a managerial class engaged in production of competitive meaning also tends to institutionalize that 'distancing' process. Until their role is seen as being as subjective as it is, the habituated 'consumptive passive' cycle of viewer/reader to artist dynamic won't be altered.

My argument here is to make a distinction between the importantly political aspects of subjectivity—as part of what precludes a necessary aspect of cultural activity to the body politic, and the institutionalization of the personal in artistic practice (expressionism and its manifestations) on one hand, and the falsely perceived *impersonal* apparatus of art historical validation, on the other.

It is no accident that art historians and critics are most fond of expressionist painters. These two practices have a kind of symbiotic relationship: the pseudo-impersonal supporting the pseudo-personal. Indeed, the one reified myth feeds off the other. And nothing satisfies the anti-intellectual bias of market forces more than the offerings of paint-encrusted reliquary, which have the blessing, and validation of the art historical clergy. Because artists of this orientation are essentially all asserting the same meaning (the tradition of painting as an institution itself always speaks louder than any individual), that meaning, as an institutionalized object, becomes a thing of nature; permitting then a cultural production by art historians and critics in relation to it. But in terms of the

political aspects of the cultural life of the artist, he or she has been silenced. For expressionism the crisis is one, finally, of authenticity. Only that which is experienced as authentic for the maker can be then experienced as authentic by the viewer/reader. As I have explained elsewhere: 'It is in the authenticity of the cultural production of a human being connected to his or her historical moment concretely that the work is experienced as real; it is the passion of a creative intelligence for the present, which informs both the past and the future. It is not that the meaning of a work of art can transcend its time, but that a work of art describes the maker's relationship to her or his context through the struggle to make meaning, and in so doing, we get a glimpse of the life of the people who shared that meaning. (For this reason, one can never make 'authentic' art—in the sense given here—by simply attempting to replicate the forms of an earlier powerful art.) In this sense *all* art is 'expressionist'. But one must understand the complexity, even delicacy, of the way in which a work of art must be so singularly the concrete expression of an individual (or individuals) that it is no longer simply about that individual, but rather, is about the culture that made such expression possible. Because of this, Expressionism, as an institutionalized style, by focusing on the individual artist in a generalized way (abstracting that which must remain concrete) has become the least expressive art of our time. It is the preferred art form for the artists who have the least to say because they count on the institution of Expressionism to do their talking for them. The 'Wild Ones' couldn't be tamer.' (1982)

II. *Elements of the Construction*

What Robert Musil addressed in *The Man Without Qualities*, the fragmenting of meaning, a basic incoherence between information, belief, and our traditions, finds its place in our conversation at this end of the century. He was one of the first to approach science as bourgeois society's emerging religion, and to chronicle in his fiction its psychic dislocation. The collapse of ideology, the institutional pragmatizing of philosophy, and the final hegemony of the market as the motor of meaning accelerates the cultural, and what another age called spiritual, compression of the individual.

Musil was suspicious of the pragmatizing reduction which language made of the complexity of our experiences. He was concerned that his writing would reflect the discontinuity which comprises much of lived experience. Part of his practice as an artist included an attempt to rupture his own habituated relationship with language which begins with the conventions of the practice of writing itself. Musil's insights into his own practice are, of course, useful to us, as is the warning he gave: *'The person who thinks artistically is threatened today by the person who does not think artistically and by the artist who does not think.'* The statement by Robert Musil employed in this installation, fragmented, is the following: *'So long as one thinks in sentences with end-points, certain things cannot be said—at most, vague feelings.'* This sentence was the connective element (theoretically and practically) which constructed this installation.

Other functional units are comprised of *photo-texts* (portraits of individuals whose production constitutes a system of thought), a recurring photograph of Robert Musil's worktable, referenced as a point of practice in general and, specifically, in the form of a varying inset—alternating images of works by me from 'Text/Context' (1979). The *photo-texts* each suggest an aspect; a conversation/description is formed by the exclusion (or inclusion) of specific *photo-texts* and, more significantly, the relationship between the cultural productions which the included *photo-texts* indicate. The choices of inclusions and exclusions are based on elements seen within the series of images of the 'Text/Context' work.

There are two *extra-functional* elements which should be mentioned that are a part of this work. One is, within the exclusional process, the political implications (meant as critical simply due to its representation of cultural power) of a conspicuous, patriarchal 'line-up'. This problem is further complicated by the fact that they also constitute, more or less but not exclusively, my on-going personal choice of a resource. The other *extra-functional* element is an aspect of my choice for the alternating images as being from the series 'Text/Context'. This work was initiated by my retrospective at the Stedelijk van Abbe Museum in Eindhoven in 1979. Dr. Rudi Fuchs was the Director of the museum at that time and commissioned the work which began this series.

Exhibition Checklist

1. 'Zero & Not', 1986
2. 'Number 182 (I/u + V/i)', 1989
3. 'R.M. #1', 1992

I want to thank Joseph Kosuth for giving me this opportunity to work together. 'Zero and Not' was first exhibited at the Leo Castelli Gallery on Greene Street in 1986. Images from that installation have become iconic over the years. To bring the work back to life after nearly 25 years has been enriching.

I want to thank Cindy Smith at the Kosuth studio for her support and endless patience.

Barbara Bertozzi Castelli

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